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Abstract 
Plantations have long been justified by moral and racial hierarchies that value specialised, 
export-oriented producers over domestic or subsistence-oriented producers. In this paper, I 
associate this value hierarchy with the neoliberal moral economy, explain its roots in 
classical political economy, provide examples of its workings and argue that the Covid-19 
crisis provides a crucial opportunity to debunk the (neo)liberal moral economy. Collective 
experiences of food insecurity wrought by the pandemic expose the fallacy of central moral 
economic values underpinning industrial capitalist food supply chains, such as comparative 
advantage. Shared experiences of food supply chain failures, borne by people in the global 
North as well as the South, strengthen the moral and economic legitimacy of alternatives. 
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Satnam Virdee1 has argued that racism was fundamental to the development of capitalism. 
From the time of colonialism, moral distinctions have separated economically rational 
individuals from backward rural ‘others’ who are often racialized.2 Colonial policies that 
favoured one ethnicity over another, such as the selective favouring of Afro- or Indo-
Trinidadians,3 enabled elites to set subaltern groups against one another,4 thwarting class 
alliances as well as alternative configurations of food and farming.5 As in the past, modern 
plantations continue to work through moral economic and often racialized binaries between 
specialised, export-oriented production/producers and domestic or subsistence-oriented 
production/producers.  
 
The recent disruption to global food supply chains wrought by Covid-19 provides an 
unprecedented opportunity to debunk such moral economic distinctions. In this brief essay, I 
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argue that collective experiences of food insecurity wrought by the pandemic expose the 
fallacy of the liberal, and now neoliberal, moral economy that underpins our food system. 
Shared experiences of food supply chain failures, borne by people in the global North as well 
as the South, strengthen the moral and economic legitimacy of alternatives.  
 
Liberalism as a moral economy 
Most scholars associate the term ‘moral economy’ with non-capitalist economies, where 
norms of fairness or justice guide transactions between a (para)statal authority and a group 
of people, such as peasants.6 Yet, as I have argued elsewhere,7 liberalism is a moral 
economy like any other, as it too establishes norms for ‘good’ economic behaviour that 
ensure justice for all. Central to the moral economy of liberalism are concepts that stem from 
classical treatises on political economy, written by European men during the initial stages of 
imperialism. One crucial theorist is Adam Smith, whose ideas of free trade and competition 
ascribed universal wealth to the unfettered flow of supply and demand between 
economically rational, self-interested individuals (in Smith’s time, these were only white, 
propertied men). Living during the height of the Atlantic slave trade and creating moral 
economic arguments used by both pro- and anti-slavery writers,8 Smith contended that free 
trade should be scaled up to the level of countries competing in a global marketplace, and 
that this form of economic organisation would establish universal prosperity for all.  
 
David Ricardo, who lived a generation after Smith, disputed the latter’s formulation; yet his 
concept of ‘comparative advantage’ continues to be extolled as a counterpart to Smith’s 
ideas.9 For Ricardo, the power comparative advantage – the mutual gains from specialised 
production and free trade – rested on the belief that it would level the playing field between 
rich and poor people and places: ‘The rhetorical power of the theory of comparative 
advantage rests on its promise that everyone will emerge a winner.’10 Yet, despite claims 
about universality, comparative advantage theory centres on specialised export production, 
creating a value hierarchy that places global market actors above peasants and others who 
produce goods for their families and communities.  
 
Questioning comparative advantage theory 
In his On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), Ricardo quantified the 
mutual benefits of specialised trade between a hypothetical Portugal and a hypothetical 
England trading in wine and cloth, respectively. His formulation has been criticised for its 
simplistic assumptions about complex socio-economic realities. First, the theory assumes 
perfect factor mobility, or the idea that in the event of an external shock both labour and 
capital can be redirected from one productive activity to another, without anyone losing out.11 
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This is not usually the case, and apart from certain exceptions (e.g. Monsanto’s re-
deployment of factories from herbicides in the 1940s to the production of Agent Orange 
during the Vietnam War, and then back to herbicides in the 1970s), fixed capitals are not so 
flexible.  
 
A second assumption of Ricardian comparative advantage is that, in a free market, all 
countries or firms are able to access and use the ‘best’ technology for specialised 
production, even if the technology is developed elsewhere.12 Yet as institutional economist 
Ha-Joon Chang13 has shown, technological and industrial development in high-income 
countries became possible only through the suspension of comparative advantage in lower-
income countries – that is – through restrictions on international technology transfer 
maintained by tariffs, subsidies and, later, intellectual property rights and patents. State 
protections were essential for the early industrial development of high-income countries, as 
Chang14 argues for the cases of textiles in the United Kingdom, cars in Japan and Nokia 
phones in South Korea.  
 
The assumption of a free market in T&D also begs the question of what we mean by the 
‘best’ technology. In the moral economy of liberalism, the best technology is that which 
ensures the most efficient production for the global market, such as high yielding varieties of 
crops and seeds. Yet this normative framework devalues other technologies that may be 
more agroecologically efficient and resilient to climatic shocks.15   
 
Perhaps most seriously, given the continued moral weight of liberalism, is the historical and 
geographical blind spots of theories such as comparative advantage. As Matthew Watson16 
argues, Ricardo’s hypothetical trade relationship between England and Portugal could not 
have worked in real life without the products of a third country, Portugal’s colony, Brazil. In 
the early nineteenth century, Portugal used Brazilian gold to prop up its waning terms of 
trade with Great Britain. Brazilian gold, in turn, was dependent the tragic flow of people from 
West Africa to the Americas, who were then enslaved to provide labour for the mines and 
sugar plantations. Ricardo’s theory, then, silences the experiences of enslaved people in 
Brazil, as well as the breakup of communities in West Africa, treating these as externalities, 
just as later economists were to treat the work of the non-human world. Yet such human and 
non-human externalities have been as crucial for the development of global capitalist supply 
chains as the moral economy itself.  
 
The example of Caribbean sugar 
4 
 
In the moral economy of liberalism, engagement in global markets is the measuring rod 
against which different kinds of production and different kinds of people are deemed 
‘worthy’.17 Economic differentiations between types of production easily slip into moral 
differentiations between types of people. The fallacy of the liberal moral economy, and its 
dangers, is evident in the case of Caribbean sugar and its neoliberalisation in 2008. Arguing 
for the need for a ‘Global Repositioning’ of the Caribbean sugar industry, Executive Director 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, Richard Bernal, argued that it was the psychology 
of Caribbean peoples, rather than any external factor, that made the regional sugar industry 
uncompetitive in global markets. ‘Why does the region take for granted that it can and will 
produce world class performers and indeed world champions in every field of sport and the 
creative arts but doubt that our entrepreneurs and workers can be internationally 
competitive?’18 Under the stranglehold of high external debts, regional actors such as Bernal 
may have little option but to uphold the hegemonic moral economy, according to which any 
divergence from collective prosperity is the fault of ‘unworthy’ individuals.  
 
There are numerous other examples of this kind of moral and political deception, all of which 
use liberal frameworks to portray a ‘harmonious view of globalization in which all countries 
can gain from trade liberalization’.19 Yet it is not the rhetoric, but how it shapes actual 
policies regarding who gets what, why and how, that concerns me here. Instead of 
acknowledging the perpetuation of past social and environmental injustices wrought by the 
sugar plantation, Bernal ‘starts from the assumption that all economies compete on an equal 
playing field’.20 Like textiles, cars and Nokia phones, however, sugar plantations could only 
rise in global importance under the protective policies of Britain’s colonial regime,21 supports 
that favoured white, male plantation owners and that directly counteracted the exigencies of 
comparative advantage. After independence, state supports for sugar, and with them social 
welfare safety nets for sugar workers and their families, were withdrawn in countries deemed 
‘uncompetitive’ in the industry such as Trinidad and Tobago. Under current ‘authoritarian 
populist’22 regimes, prime agricultural lands are being usurped for residential and industrial 
development. The remaining farmers who produce high-input, specialised crops for export 
receive far more public resources than low-input small farmers, who feed far more people. 
 
Covid-19: a global food systems crisis 
The present moral economy of neoliberalism continues to influence where public funds are 
directed and who is prioritised for ‘development’, even though it bears less and less 
resemblance to the ways global supply chains actually work. Instead of sovereign nations, 
global supply chains are controlled by an increasingly consolidated number of companies, 
mostly from the Global North, who reap vast profits from managing just-in-time orders 
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between a global network of producers and buyers. The speed of these transactions is 
facilitated by complex computational systems and (mostly) European finance companies, 
who provide short-term credit to make up for any payment delays between producers and 
buyers, and trade credit insurance to ensure that producers receive money in the event of 
buyers’ insolvency. While fixed capitals still make up all the nodes in the network, including 
plantations, factories, ships, trucks, etc., their operations increasingly depend on powerful 
umbrella companies that coordinate connections between them. 
 
Given the interdependencies between each specialised link in the productive chain, if a 
shock (e.g. the pandemic) enters the system, the whole system may be compromised. Jan 
Douwe van der Ploeg provides a recent European example.23 With Italian restaurants closed 
during periods of lockdown, the demand for luxury Italian dishes such as vitello tonnato (veal 
with tuna sauce) came to a halt. The fall in demand for veal led to a sharp drop in imports of 
male calves from Germany and Eastern Europe into the Netherlands, where calves are 
usually fattened on dairy farms and processed in slaughterhouses for shipment to Italy. 
During lockdown, dairy farms in the Netherlands were full of calves, who no longer provided 
income to the umbrella company controlling the supply chain, Van Drie Group. Dairy farmers 
in the Netherlands contended with sharp decreases in milk prices, while restauranteurs in 
Italy faced insolvency.24  
 
Such vulnerabilities of global supply chains have taken shape across the globe, though to 
varying degrees. In wealthy countries, Covid-19 has induced food shortages, panic buying, 
and other food system shocks, leading to empty supermarket shelves. Shelves have been 
restocked quickly, however, as wealthy governments such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom have been providing billions to back trade credit insurance providers and as 
supply chain data management systems adapt to the new circumstances. In poorer 
countries, the situation is much more calamitous. In urban areas of Africa which depend on 
imported plantation rice from India, Vietnam, Cambodia and Myanmar, the effects of Covid-
19 are felt increasingly in the stomach, giving rise to a ‘hunger pandemic’ that may be 
deadlier than the biomedical pandemic itself.25 Across the world, Covid-19 has 
disproportionately affected Black and Asian populations,26 and the economic effects of the 
pandemic have hit low-income people of colour the hardest, as migrant agricultural workers 
are immobilised, remittances are paused and fixed capitals are unable to shift to other 
productive activities. 
 
Debunking the moral economy 
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As citizens and states reel during the crisis, cracks in the moral economy of neoliberalism 
are beginning to surface. The presumed advantages of global market integration and 
specialisation have become increasingly questionable, not only for social movements such 
as Via Campesina, who have long defended the rights of ‘peasants’ to control their own 
supply chains, but for governments across the world. In Jamaica, where the sugar plantation 
and its legacies continues to discipline people, places and plants in the neoliberal era, the 
pandemic has focused government attention on small farmers and short food supply chains. 
In line with previous efforts, the Jamaican government is promoting a ‘Say Yes to Fresh’ 
campaign, which encourages Jamaicans to buy local produce, while the government is 
dealing with bottlenecks in food supply chains by buying and selling small farmers’ produce 
directly.27 In the United Kingdom, food and vegetable box schemes and local butchers have 
been given a boost during the pandemic, as wealthier consumers are unable to spend their 
extra cash on dining out.28 Other UK residents have taken up gardening to overcome food 
shortages.29 Despite these positive trends, the majority of people in the world, in the global 
North as well as the South, depend on global supply chains for cheap, industrially produced 
food.  
 
Given their flexibility, mixed farming systems are better able to respond to external shocks 
than specialised farms, including climatic shocks. Low-input, family farms rely less on 
external markets for inputs, technologies, seeds, and labour than specialised plantations, 
and often market produce directly.30 As Ploeg argues:31 ‘In the framework of “modernization” 
such features were all considered as signs of weakness and backwardness (‘legacies of the 
past’), but in times of Covid-19 they re-emerge as embodying resilience’. As countries halt 
exports of grains and other essentials to feed their populations, the pandemic is re-playing 
global food crises, which will continue to recur unless governments, aid agencies and civil 
society to come together to radically reverse moral and economic biases against domestic 
and subsistence agriculture. 
 
Conclusion 
Moral economies create powerful logics for perpetuating the status quo, even if the practices 
so endorsed are destructive to people and planet.32 The industrial capitalist food system has 
been enforced, legitimated and sustained through a moral economy of liberalism, which 
prioritises globally-derived economic value over all other values and human/non-human 
relationships. Given the serious failings outlined in this essay, it is alarming that Eurocentric 
concepts such as comparative advantage, free trade and competition, and related 
assumptions about ‘good’ economic behaviour, continue to provide the moral, political and 




Yet with Covid-19, the failings of this model, and its moral economic foundations, are more 
than ever in evidence. As Ploeg33 argues, Covid-19 has uncovered major structural 
weaknesses in the global food system, namely the dominance of the financial economy over 
the bread and butter of real food economies. With states and citizens in both the global 
North and South restructuring supply chains to feed their people, now is the time to find 
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